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FEDERAL TAXATION
PERSPECTIVE DuRING THE FIFTH DECADE

]. W. Riehm*

S

INCE the enactment of the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act
_ of October 3, 19131 forty years have elapsed within which we
have seen a profound change in the revenue system of our federal
government, the growth of a great new branch of public law, the
development of a highly specialized field of legal practice and the
publication in legal periodicals of innumerable articles on the subject
of taxation. Tax men can, with great pride, point out that technical
proficiency has done an amazing job of keeping pace with the rapid
expansion of the system from the utilization of the latest punch card
accounting machines by the Internal Revenue Service to an orderly
procedure for the hearing of thousands of taxpayers' protests before
a tribunal which did not exist prior to 1924,2 to the creation of professional journals dealing exclusively with taxation. There is no
reason to believe that technological progress will falter in the next
decade regardless of the course federal taxation may take. The course
it will take is the real matter of concern and is in large measure controlled by the perspective of those individuals who formulate tax policies, the members of the congressional committees, the judges, the
policy makers within the Treasury Department, and the experts who
influence those officials, the accountants, the economists, and the members of the tax bar. It is with the subject of perspective that this
article is concerned, and the thesis of the following comments is that
the perspective must be sweeping; that those individuals concerned.
with tax policy should consciously acknowledge that taxation is an
integral part of the legal and economic fabric of the country and that
changes in tax policy must be correlated with changes in basic economic and legal philosophy.

""Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.-Ed.
166 (1913).
of Tax Appeals was established by §900, Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat.
L. 336 (1924).
1 38 Stat. L.
2 The Board
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Absent a significant shift in monetary and £seal policies to deficit
financing of governmental operations, the world outlook for the next
decade is such that high budgets can be covered only by high revenue
yields. 3 Since it is axiomatic that sustained high taxes magnify the
weaknesses in any revenue system and intensify the search for loopholes the strain on the federal tax structure will doubtless increase as
the next decade wears on. Where will the strain be felt, what will
be done to relieve it? It will be felt at the points at which taxpayers
feel that pressure may bring relief, in Congress at the point of enactment, in the Internal Revenue Service at the point of administration
and in the courts at the point of interpretation. The responses of
Congress, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts will reilect
the approach of the individuals in those branches of the government
who formulate tax policies by legislation, regulation or decision. If
the perspective of those individuals is narrow, if they look only to a
solution of the particular problem before them at the moment and fail
to coordinate their responses in such a way as to formulate broad integrated policies, a collapse of the federal tax system or the destruction
of some sectors of our economy may be anticipated within the decade.
For that reason it behooves those tax experts who appear before the
Congress, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service to eschew the
partisan approach and acknowledge their duty to aid the legislators,
administrators and judges in formulating sound tax policies.
Taxation is so much a part of monetary and £seal policy, so involved
in general economic theory and so related to law that it cannot be
divorced from economics or law.4 Yet people often toy with the idea
of divorce, or at least separation, when dealing with certain aspects of
taxation. Whether it is done through ignorance or maliciousness is
often hard to determine, but regardless of how done, it creates damage
and increases the strain on the tax structure. If the economic and
legal climate is changing in one direction and the tax structure is
modified in the opposite direction the structure may collapse.5 While
there is little hope of changing the approach of the individual who
maliciously advocates modification running counter to the economic
and legal climate, those who act through ignorance can be educated,
3 In the budget message delivered to Congress on January 21, 1954, President Eisenhower estimated total expenditures for the 1955 fiscal year of $65.6 billion, total receipts
of $62.7 billion and renewed his request to Congress to raise the debt limit which is fixed
at $275 billion. 100 CoNG. R:sc. 545 (Jan. 21, 1954) (H. Doc. 264). Since mid-1953
the outstanding debt has averaged in excess of $272.5 billion.
4.ANDEnsoN, TAXATION AND nm AMEmcAN EcoNoMY xix (1951).
5 Sedillot, ''Why Frenchmen Don't Pay Taxes," N.Y. T1MEs, Sept. 6, 1953, §VI, p. 14.
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even self-educated. Unfortunately there is a lack of written material
dealing expressly with the relationship of taxation to other fields of
economics and law, few formal courses relating to the matter of the
relationship are offered in law schools or graduate schools and often
times professional jealousies make communication between accountants, economists and lawyers almost impossible. Unquestionably a
conscious attempt is being made to :6.ll the gaps which exist in the
writings6 and in the course offerings;7 and communication must be
expanded, not at the price of pride, but at the price of conceit. Each
profession can learn much from the others that will make for a better
tax structure. In an attempt to accelerate movement toward that goal
a conscious practice should be made of expressly reconciling proposed
changes in the tax policy with what is honestly believed to be a true
picture of the present economic and legal structure of the country.
If it is felt by some that they are not familiar enough with the economic and legal structure of the country to be able to anticipate the
manifold consequences of their proposed change in tax policy on the
entire structure they would do well to reflect on whether they are
acting in an irresponsible manner by advocating the change. If they
feel they can predict the economic and legal consequences of their
proposal because their predictions rest on reason, let them reflect on
whether their reasoning, if it is through use of the syllogism, may
perhaps rest on an implied major premise which proves to be false
when subjected to careful scrutiny. In short, we must stop irresponsible statements which may influence those congressmen, judges and
tax administrators who effect the alterations in our tax structure. They
face perhaps the most difficult decade in the history of the federal
income tax and they must have all the aid the professional accountants, economists and lawyers can give them in formulating sound
tax policies.
Sound tax policies are effected by the creation of a tax structure
which mirrors the canons of taxation, which in reality are but shorthand statements reflecting the effectiveness with which a tax has been
integrated into the then existing economic and legal fabric of the
country. One of the earliest, and certainly the best known, state6 For examples, see BLOUGH, THB FEDERAL T.AXING PROCESS (1952), PooL.B, FISCAL
Poucms AND nm AMERICAN EcoNoMY (1951), .ANDERSON, TAXATION AND nm AMERICAN EcoNoMY (1951), THE NATIONAL TAX JoURNAL.
7 For examples, see CoLU:MllIA UNIVERSITY ScHOOL OF LAw BULLETIN, 53d series,
No. 37, p. 34; 50 HARvARD UNIVERSITY LAw SCHOOL BuLLBTIN, No. 7, p. 57; 53 UmVl!RSITY oF M:rcmGAN LAw ScHooL ANNoUNCBMENT, No. 73, p. 29; 1954 SoUTHBRN
METHODIST UNIVERSITY _CATALOGUE, Pt. VI, School of Law Bulletin, p. 46.
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men ts of the canons of taxation appeared in Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nations in I 776. He said:
"I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards
the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the
state. . . .•
"II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay, ought
to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be dear
and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. . . .
"III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the
manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. . . .
"IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out
and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible,
over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the
state. . . ."8
Since the time of Adam Smith many economists have set down their
conceptions of the canons of taxation and a recent study of those
economists has classified their statements according to certain broad
categories,9 indicating that there are social, economic and ethical canons, £seal canons and administrative canons.10 The study went on
to demonstrate that as the conception of the capitalistic economy has
evolved from the time of Adam Smith to date there has been a corresponding evolution in the terms in which the canons are· stated,
e.g., references by Smith to the canon of equality presumed sacrifice
proportional to the income of the taxpayer while today equality incorporates the conception of sacrifice based on progression.11 It is
thus apparent that if one is familiar with the evolution of the canons
of taxation over the past 177 years he may have acquired knowledge
which will enable him to predict the degree and direction of their
evolution in the decade ahead. To the extent the canons reflect economic evolution, the observation of professional economists should
be given careful consideration; to the extent they reflect legal evolution, the observation of lawyers should be useful in evaluating proposed changes in the tax structure. If action which is in accord
s Book V, c. II, part II, Modem Library Ed., 777-778 (1937).
9 Gulick, "Basic Goals of Federal Taxation," lNcoME TAX ADMINISTRATION 3 (1949).
lOid. at 4.

llld. at 6.
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with the basic economic and legal theory reflected in the canons is
then taken in respect of a specific tax proposal a collapse of the tax
system or damage to any important sector of the economy need not
be feared. However, a brief review of two areas in which the professional tax experts have sought to influence those individuals who
formulate tax policy will illustrate a narrowness of perspective and a
failure expressly to relate tax policy to basic economic and legal theory
which does not augur well for the decade ahead. The first is the
congressional arena in which the Internal Revenue Code has been
undergoing an examination and overhaul, the second is the arena in
which the opinions of the Supreme Court in certain tax cases have
been subject to searching criticism, i.e., the law reviews.
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 194812 we have seen numerous technical changes in the Internal Revenue Code13 made for
the purpose of correcting what were apparently felt to be inherent
inequalities of treatment among taxpayers. The extended hearings
of the House Ways and Means Committee during the summer of
195314 also reflected the felt need for a more or less complete overhaul of the code to get rid of inequalities, as have the reports emanating from the committee as it works on the current act.15 All of
those actions reflect the fact that as the years of high tax rates continue the protests of the public mount, and they raise the serious
question of whether inequalities are really being removed or actually
compounded, for as one taxpayer benefits from a special technical
amendment all other taxpayers suffer a detriment in respect of their
relationship to the benefitted taxpayer. To use the language of the
noted economist Roy Blough, "So-called 'technical' amendments commonly present the problem of whether they promote uniformity by
removing special hardships or create discrimination by granting special privileges."16 In commenting on the Revenue Act of 1948 increase in the exemption to blind people, Professor Surrey said:
"And again, it should be apparent that the income tax is not
the vehicle for relief to special groups handicapped by physical
ailments. . . . To prevent such distortions of the exemption
12 Stat. L. 110 (passed April 2, 1948, over presidential veto).
13 For examples, see Technical Changes Act, 63 Stat. L. 891

(1949); Revenue Act
of 1951, 65 Stat. L. 452 (1951); Technical Changes Act of 1953, 67 Stat. L. 615 (1953).
14 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on General Revenue Revision,
83d Cong., 1st sess. (1954).
15 See statements of Chairman Reed of House Ways and Means Committee, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1954, p. 15:4.
16 BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PROCESS 22 (1952).
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provisions of the income tax, both the old-age and blindness exemptions should be eliminated. But such exemptions, once
granted, are difficult to remove and, more likely breed additional
aberrations."11
The aberrations are on the increase and if the demands for revenue
continue high one cannot predict where they will end. In addition
to what might be called the group aberrations there have crept into
the code a number of amendments which, if enacted in the field of
municipal corporation law would be called "special" legislation. It
is sufficient to enumerate only a few examples to indicate precisely
what is meant. While it is generally acknowledged that many years
ago section 120 of the code relating to unlimited charitable contributions was enacted for the purpose of making certain charitable
deductions available to an extremely limited class of taxpayers1 8 the
number of special exceptions have increased rapidly in recent years;
for example, the provisions of section 23(0)(6) made provision for
a special charitable deduction for certain contributions to the United
Nations19 [see also section 23 (q)]. It is understood that section
ll 7(p) dealing with taxability to employee of termination payments
was also enacted to cover a special situation. 20 Turning for the moment to the Federal Estate Tax the enactment of section 863(c) was
for the purpose of accommodating another special situation.21 Many
similar provisions can readily be called to mind by people intimately
familiar with the code and the recent amendments to it, particularly
in the relief provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950.22
This is not to decry what has been done but to raise questions.
Is Congress cognizant of what it has done by enacting provisions of
that kind? How many more such amendments can the code stand
before it becomes a completely unintelligible maze, even to the tax
expert? If such action continues throughout the next decade will
the federal tax structure more nearly conform to the canons of taxation or have departed further from them? The answers are fairly
obvious and demonstrate the need for a reorientation to the canons
of taxation by the congressional committees and a change in the
methods used in presenting proposals to the committees. There is
17 Surrey, ''Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948," 61 HARv.
L. Rav. 1097 at 1103 (1948).
18 Revenue Act of 1924, §214(a)(I0), 43 Stat. L. 271.
19 61 Stat. L. 6 (1947).
20 Revenue Act of 1951, §329, 65 Stat. L. 504 (1951).
21 64 Stat. L. 576 (1950).
22 64 Stat. L. 1137 (1951).
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little evidence to show how consciously the congressional committees
reconcile the proposals submitted to them with their conception of
the canons of taxation, so all that can be done is to urge upon them
the advisability of such conduct. There is, however, considerable
evidence relating to the methods used in presenting proposals to the
committees, in the form of the published hearings. The reports of
the hearings unfortunately reB.ect a uniformly partisan approach as
the reader might well expect.23 If partisan approach was always
balanced by partisan approach it might be expected that the committee members would be able to formulate rules that would be just
to all, but too often proposals are not balanced by counter proposals;
and too often the presentation is so confused or slanted that the committees cannot accurately assess the impact on the tax structure that
would result from adoption of a specific proposal.24 While it is acknowledged that anyone appearing before a committee has a right
to be an advocate he should remember that he owes a higher duty
to his country than to an individual client,2 5 and when called on to
aid a congressional committee in formulating their judgment he should
make explicit the economic, political and social implications implicit
in the proposals which he makes. If the individual is advocating
a special exception for a particular taxpayer it would seem that he
owes the duty to make the point clear; if he is advocating a proposal
which involves an inherent change in or which is not consistent with
existing monetary and fiscal policy he should acknowledge the fact
and ,offer sound reasons for advocating such change. In short, he
should be willing to lay a £rm background for the proposal rather
than attempt to hide what he considers to be points about which
objections might be raised.
An example of an area in which the congressional committees
should have the clearest possible view of the relationships of the
proposal to basic economic, political and social premises is found in
the current controversy over the proposed 25 percent constitutional
limitation on the income tax, 26 which in turn reB.ects on the basic
concept of progressive taxation. Yet the views expressed generally
fail to discuss the basic consequences which would B.ow from adoption of the proposal. Since non-adoption would not affect the status
23 BLOUGH,

THE

FEDERAL

TAXING PROCESS 32 (1952).

24Ihid.
25 Swaine, "Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of the
Modem Bar," 35 A.B.A.J. 89, 171 (1949).
26 Popularly known as the Reed-Dirksen Amendments, H.J. Res. 323, 82d Cong., 1st
sess. (1951), H.J. Res. 103, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953).
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quo the opponents may perhaps be excused for not probing deeply
into the consequences,27 but that does not excuse the proponents from
discharging their duty. In a recent review of the volume The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation by Blum and Kalven,28 Albert L.
Hopkins said:
"Progressive income tax violates the fundamental American
principle that a hard-working, thrifty person is entitled to the
fruits of his labor. The real difference in incomes, in the main,
results from intelligence, hard work and the willingness to forego immediate spending and save for the furore. Such savings
are invested in productive property, which is not only of benefit
to the state but is of benefit to the person who saved and invested.
The amount of income on inherited wealth is relatively unimportant when compared with the total income of the country.
As soon as we depart from these fundamental principles, we
approach socialism, which is practically the same as communism,
as practiced in those countries where there is a free right to vote.
No socialist government has ever survived, and the communist
government will survive only so long as it can maintain its tyranny
and dictatorship through military power."29
In the same journal Robert B. Dresser published an article entitled
"The Reed-Dirksen Amendment: A Reply to Professor Cary"30 in
which he made reference to an article by William R. Biggs, VicePresident of the Bank of New York, and extracted the following comments by Mr. Biggs:
"The second and most outstanding conclusion to be drawn
from this srudy is the vulnerability of the receipts side of the
federal budget to a business decline. In the last twelve years
the United States has built up a revenue system which depends
to the extent of nearly 80% of total receipts on corporate and
individual income taxes. No government in the world, to our
knowledge, raises such a large proportion of its budget from income taxes (personal and corporate) as the United States. In
most countries, including members of the British Commonwealth,
the percentage of the budget raised from income taxes (personal and corporate) is nearer 50% than the 80% in the United
27 For comment in opposition, see Griswold, "Can We Limit Taxes to 25 Per Cent?"
190 ATLANrIC MoNTHLY, p. 76 (Aug. 1952); Cary, "The Income Tax Amendment: A
Strait Jacket for Sound Fiscal Policy," 39 A.B.A.J. 885 (1953).
28 Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press (1953).
20 40 A.B.A.J. 51 (1954).
ao Id. at 35.
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States. Because of this dependence on income taxes, revenues
are especially difficult to predict. . . .
"A decline in business and in profits finds the government
a deeply involved partner, so that its tax receipts fade very
rapidly. . . .
"These estimated budget deficits are disturbing as an indication of what may be in store for the United States economy in
the event of a decline in business. . . .
"If the long-term integrity of the dollar is to be maintained,
the present top-heavy dependence for revenue on income taxes
must be adjusted. Reform of the revenue system will not be
easy politically, since it will involve finding new sources of income such as a national sales tax of some kind."31
The foregoing are fairly illustrative of the position taken by the advocates of the proposed amendment and may be summarized approximately as follows: extremely high progression is bad because it
sti8.es initiative and interferes with savings (the consequences of
which may ultimately destroy our capitalistic society), the revenue
system is top-heavy income -tax wise and therefore vulnerable to recession, the solution lies in the adoption of some kind of a national
sales tax.
If the concept of burden of proof is invoked for the moment it
would seem that the proponents must be able to reconcile their proposal with the existing basic economic, social and political premises.
The conclusions drawn by most of the well recognized economists
as to forces controlling the economic well being of this country re8.ect Keynesian, or at least quasi-Keynesian economic philosophy.
Keynes drew certain conclusions in respect of savings which have
been nicely described in lay language by the economist Heilbroner
as follows:
"There is one portion of our incomes which does not go directly out onto the market place to become another's income: that
is the money we save.
"If we tucked our savings into mattresses or hoarded them
in cash, we should obviously disturb the evenness of the circular
8.ow of income. . . . If such a freezing process were widespread
and continued, there would soon be a cumulative fall in everybody's money income, as less and less was handed around at each
turn. We should be suffering from a depression.
"But this dangerous break in the income 8.ow does not in fact
take place. For in a civilized community we do not freeze our
3l!d. at 37.
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savings. We put them into stocks or bonds or banks and in this
way make it possible for them to be used again. . . •
"But-and notice this vital fact-there is nothing automatic
about this savings-investment channel. Business does not ordinarily need savings to carry on its operations; it works within
its regular budget and pays its expenses from the proceeds of its
sales. Business only needs savings if it is expanding its operation
-for its regular receipts will not usually provide it with enough
capital to build a new factory or to add substantially to its equipment.
"And here is where the trouble enters. A thrifty community
will always attempt to save some part of its income. But business
is not always in a position to expand its operations. . . .
"And therein lies the possibility of depression. For if our
savings do not become invested by expanding business firms, our
incomes must decline. We should be in the same spiral of cohtractip_p. as if we had frozen our savings by hoarding them." 32
However, it must be remembered that in formulating his General
Theory of Employment Interest and Money 33 Keynes did not theorize
about savings separate and apart from other concepts. The Keynesian
system is couched in terms of aggregate concepts and incorporates
five equations and five variables, of which savings-investment is only
a single factor which must be integrated into the system at a particular point in time along with the others.34 As other factors in the
equation change, the savings-investment factor must change, be encouraged or discouraged or held static. Consequently, it would seem
that the proponents of such a profound change in the tax structure
should present detailed evidence of the effect of the change on such
factors as consumption, employment and interest rates to the congressional committees for their consideration. If a condition of full
employment is the sought goal35 and if increased consumption will
produce full employment and if a sales tax is a deterrent to consumption,36 Congress obviously would not want to adopt a national sales
tax to make up for revenue lost by the placing of a ceiling on income
taxes. If respectable economists believe that one of the fiscal advantages of the income tax is its cyclical nature, i.e., that the re3 2 HEILBRONER, THE WoRLDLY PmLosoPHERs 255 (1953).
33 New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. (1936).
34 Cf. KLEIN, THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION 56 (1947).
35 Id. at 168. Cf. Employment Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 23
cern over unemployment, N.Y. T1MEs, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 1:8.
36 On the issue of whether sales tax is aways a deterrent, see

Level of Employment," 2 NAT. TAX

J.

122 (1949).

(1946); presidential conDue, "Sales Tax and the
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duction of revenue in time of deflation and increase in revenue in
time of inflation is a useful tool in controlling inflation and deflation,37
should not the proponent of the change make those views known to
Congress too? Unfortunately the Congress does not appear to be
receiving the detailed guidance it should on this matter even from
the Council of Economic Advisers if a recent interview of the Chairman, Dr. Arthur F. Burns, by the New York Times reflects the information being submitted to Congress. The report of the interview
reads in part as follows:
"In an essay written in 1948, (Dr. Burns) made this observation about Government policy in the depression of the Nineteen
Thirties: 'On the whole, consumer spending responded much
better to the Governmental measures than private investment.'
"How, then, could he justify an Administration tax policy
now that puts emphasis on incentives to private _investment rather
than on consumer spending? . . .
"The circumstances were quite different then, he explained.
The present tax program would have made no sense whatever in
the early days of that depression. Business confidence was shattered. Now it is different. Stock prices are up, commodity
prices are not down. Investment expenditures are being pretty
well maintained. Business confidence is running high. There
is a good chance of stimulating investment further.
"As the question is being stated-'do you want to stimulate
consumption or production?'-Dr. Burns continued, the 'underconsumptionists' would win.
"But, he said, that does not state the issue correctly. As the
facts are now, he said, if you cut a consumer's tax $1, he may
spend from zero to $1, no more. If you cut business taxes $1,
business may spend as much as $50. A new environment for
business spending is created.
"If business confidence is high, why is there a need to stimulate it?
"There has been a decline, he said, adding that no responsible thinker can say positively it will be self-limiting. It could
become a spiraling contraction.''38
The proponents of the constitutional amendment have not explained how the tremendous expansion of the economy since World
War II was effected if savings have been in short supply; nor have
188 (1951).
38Loftus, ''Burns Confident of Business Vigor," N.Y. Tx:MEs, Feb. 22, 1954, §l, p.
11:1.
37 .ANDERSON, TAXATION AND nm AMEmcAN EcoNOMY
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they indicated whether the proposed change would produce an increase in the· rate of creation and expansion of corporate enterprises
without collateral modification of a tax structure which imposes only
a single tax on income that Hows through a corporation to a bondholder as interest but a double tax on that which is a dividend. Will
the desired economic political and social consequences result if that
which became available for savings through reduced taxes Hows into
insurance and the insurance companies invest it as debt capital rather
than equity capital? The proponents of the plan obviously have
answers to such basic questions, yet their writings at best carry only
implications. The• problems that confront Congress in the decade
ahead are of such magnitude that it needs to view them in the broadest
perspective, but perspective can hardly be based on implications. What
is needed are fewer implications and more expressed conclusions which
can be examined critically by the Congress and the public as a whole.
Thus far these. observations have been focused on the relationship between the Congress and those who appear before it advocating
changes in the code. Now consider for a moment the relationship
existing between the courts and those lawyers appearing before them
in tax cases. The status of that relationship is fairly well revealed in
critiques of the tax decisions.
A review of comments made on the decisions of the Supreme
Court in federal tax cases since 1940 reflects an interesting shift in
the opinion of the writers. Many were critical of the scope of such
landmark decisions as Hallock, 39 Clifford,40 Adams, and Bazley,41
Tower and Lusthaus42 and Court Holding Company.43 The comments carried either express or implied criticism to the effect that the
rationale of the decisions was so vague that one could never be sure
in advising a client whether a fact situation under consideration fell
within or without the purview of the cases.44 After some time had
elapsed and much confusion had been created in the lower courts,
the issuance of Treasury Decisions amending the Regulations applicable to the code provisions under which those cases arose, e.g., TD
39 Helvering

v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
41 Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947).
4 2 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 539 (1946).
43 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945).
44 For examples, see Magill, ''What Shall be Done With the Clifford Case?" 45 CoL.
L. REv. 111 (1945); Magill, "Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets," 47 CoL. L. REv. 707
(1947).
40
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548845 promulgating the Clifford regulations, were greeted with acclaim as clear expression of standards on which one could rely in tax
planning.46 More recently the Supreme Court decided the Culbertson case,47 and in that opinion it criticized certain interpretations
which had been placed on its opinions in Tower and Lusthaus. It
did the same in the Cumberland Public Service Company case48 which
modified Court Holding Company. The opinions in those two cases
reflect an attempt by the Court to define more sharply the concepts
formulated in Tower and Lusthaus and Court Holding Company and
when coupled with more recent decisions reflects a reluctance to deal
with the issues before it as broadly as it did in the early 194Os. The
response of the tax bar to this apparent shift to a more narrow technique of statutory interpretation is reflected in the favorable comments
on the recent _decisions as relatively precise statements on which a
practitioner engaged in tax planning can rely with considerable assurance.49
At this point it may be worth while to speculate on the consequences which may How from a shift in the technique of statutory
interpretation such as that just sketched, to determine whether the
attitude of the commentators remains static or is responsive to the
shifts in technique. It becomes apparent on reflection that while precise statements of the scope of a statute makes for ease in compliance,
such precise statements simultaneously mark the boundaries for circumvention. It might be well for those who applaud decisions such
as Cumberland Public Service Company as the answer to confusion
created by Court Holding Company to review that line of cases dealing
with the "transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after his death" clause of section 8ll(c) of the code,50 from
May 11. Heine~ 1 to Klein 11. United States5 2 to the St. Louis Trust
Company cases53 to Hallock. 54 It will be recalled that in the St.
451946-1 Cum. Bul. 19.

46 For example, see Guterman,

"The New Clifford Regulations," 1 TAX L. REv. 379
(1946).
47 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949).
48 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280 (1950).
4 9 For examples, see Gutkin and Beck, "Culbertson Case May Herald New Era in
Family Partnerships," 88 J. Acm:. 121 (1949); Gutkin and Beck, "Sale of Assets Received
on Liquidation," 28 TAXEs 328 (1950).
50 Reference is to the form of §8ll(c) prior to amendment by Technical Changes Act
of 1949, 63 Stat. 891 (1949).
51281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286 (1930).
52 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398 (1931).
53 Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74 (1935); Becker v. St.
Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 78 (1935).
54 Hclvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
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Louis Trust Company cases a change in the form of the words of
creation of the interests was found to be sufficient to avoid the application of the rule of the Klein case. Then came the Hallock decision which overruled the St. Louis Trust Company cases, and in
so doing produced Justice Frankfurter's famous statement: "Such an
essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass existing
intricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it could hardly
strengthen the rational foundations of law."55
While one may argue that it is beyond the province of the Court
to concern itself with the rational foundations of the tax law since
the foundations of that law are supposed to be the concrete statements of the Congress resting on the granite of the Constitution, sucl}.
an argument immediately encounters difficulties. Unless the Congress is willing to draft very detailed statutes it must perforce delegate
to the courts the task of legislating in the intersticial areas by statutory
interpretation. If the Congress is most detailed in its drafting the
very precision which is sought marks the boundaries for circumvention
just as in the case of the court decisions, and once again the courts
must become concerned with maintaining the rational foundations of
the law unless the public is willing to allow the loophole to remain
until Congress closes it. An excellent example of that type problem
is found in the history of the Clifford56 type short term irrevocable
trust. Following considerable controversy regarding the taxability of
the grantor on the income earned by short term trusts, Congress
enacted as a part of the Revenue Act of 1934 the section which became section 166 of the code.57 That section made the income from
revocable trusts taxable to the grantor, but made no reference to
irrevocable trusts. In 1934 the taxpayer, Clifford, created a five year
irrevocable trust of which his wife was the beneficiary. The Commissioner contended that the income of the trust was taxable to Clifford and when the case reached the Supreme Court it upheld the
Commissioner, imposing the tax under the sweeping language of section 22(a), declining to heed the dissenting argument of Justice Roberts to the effect that past administrative interpretation and the carefully drawn section 166 evidenced a congressional intent not to tax
income from irrevocable trusts to grantors.58 Though it took nearly
six years to promulgate the clarifying Clifford regulations Congress
55Id. at 117.
56 Helvering v. Clifford,
57 Revenue Act of 1934,
58 309 U.S. 331 at 339.

309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
§166, 48 Stat. L. 729 (1934).
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never reversed the Supreme Court by enacting legislation contra to
the decision, so it may be presumed that that Court's interpretation
was in accord with the rational foundation of the tax laws.
The tax practitioner who views a particular decision as too narrow
or too broad should perhaps reflect on the vantage point from which
he views the decision before he criticizes it publicly. If he is concerned with a tax problem to which the decision is pertinent his
viewpoint may well vary depending on whether he is representing a
client who is planning a particular transaction, or one who has completed a transaction and is seeking advice as to what tax consequences
have been generated. More often than not the man who is in the
planning stage wants a well marked course which he can traverse,
knowing that pleasant consequences will be assured and unpleasant
consequences avoided, while the man in the post-transaction stage·
wishes to show that the course was ill marked and that he should
be excused for his excursions into pitfalls. As might be expected our
attitude toward the manner in which we would like to see a particular
court approach the interpretation of a particular statute varies in the
same way.
No tax practitioner can honestly say that the courts have no right
to legislate. Such a statement would be an indication of a complete
lack of understanding on his part of jurisprudence generally and statutory interpretation specifically, for what is interpretation but a form
of legislation. Yet no one wants to see the judiciary usurping the
prerogative of the legislative branch. Where we place ourselves between the two extremes is in large measure controlled by our perspective. Until we are well satisfied with the range of our perspective, having weighed our personal bias, we should be wary of expressing our views on specific decisions for we may well confuse the
courts in their search for an approach consistent with the rational
foundations of the tax laws.
CONCLUSION

It has been emphasized recently that the public has little to do
with the formulation of tax policies,59 and that responsibility rests,
indirectly, at least, in those professional tax men, the accountant, the
economist and the lawyer who influence Congress and the courts.60
59 Redlich, ''Truces and Politics: The Lessons of 1952," 8 TAX L. REv. 381 397
(1953).
'
ao Ibid.
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Since it is apparent that responsibility will increase during the decade
ahead those men must determine whether they are adequately prepared to assume it. The observations that have been drawn here indicate some disregard of that sense of responsibility in the past and
a lack of preparation which may be harmful to the country in the
future. Fortunately the disregard does not appear to have been willful; rather it has been unconscious, often resulting from a failure to
relate specific proposals, or thoughtless observations, to basic economic,
political and social principles. We can therefore look ahead with
confidence in our ability to formulate the tax policies of the next
decade if we are willing consciously to accept our professional responsibility, eschewing the partisan and the thoughtless, bearing in
mind this observation:
"But in the higher reaches of thought, when we come to more
complicated situations, conscious resort to principles becomes
necessary. To hide from ourselves the general principles that
we do in fact follow, and to delude ourselves into the belief that
we have no philosophy, is certainly not conducive to clear
thinking." 61
61 CoHEN,
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